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Abstract

The increased use of cyber warfare, accomplished by both state and non-state actors,
raises questions about traditional approaches to security and what can be done to stop
threats in a technology-driven society. This thesis analyzes how cyber actions interact
with geopolitics and how that relationship can provide a foundation for states to approach
creating a cyber security strategy. Specifically, there should be a strategy of deterrence
and then an international system of norms and laws. The first part of this thesis will
address the connections between cyberspace and geography. It will then lay out the
strategy of deterrence and how the international sphere should approach the new type of
war.
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Approaching Cyber Warfare: Geopolitics, Deterrence, and International Law
States are confronted with security questions along a broad spectrum, covering the
land, air, and sea. The modern age has added a new realm to warfare: cyberspace. Cyber
warfare operates through technology and provides information and power to states as
well as individuals. Because of this, states need to adapt to new threats. Policymakers
need to understand the emerging climate of warfare and approach it with vigilance. The
solution will not be an easy one and will require multiple steps to cover the different
types of attacks that can occur. Though cyberspace has a virtual component, it is founded
in physical spaces. This means that a strategy should be developed within that
framework.
Cyberspace Encounters Geography
The political sphere has been influenced by how power and space interact. States
are determined by the territory that they are able to control, as defined by their borders.
Their power is not grounded in a theoretical position but connected to geographical
space. A state’s power only goes as far as a fictional line that is constructed across a solid
physical object. Political actors, individual men and states alike, have respected a
geographical system and expanded it to the air and sea as well. Physical spaces have been
connected with the essence of power since the foundation of the modern state. However,
there is a debate about whether this framework can continue in the new era of
technology.1 States have access to new means of attack and espionage through cyber
systems that were not available in the previous decades. Non-state actors, such as private

1

John B. Sheldon, “Geopolitics and Cyber Power: Why Geography Still Matters,” American Foreign
Policy Interests 36, no. 5 (2014): 286.
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individuals, also have access to cyberspace. This raises the question of whether or not a
framework of geopolitical sovereignty is still the best to follow.
The first point to address is that cyber actions do not take place separate from a
physical place. Cyberspace relies on a physical infrastructure to function.2 It is a
connected system of computers, servers, grids, the Internet, and other network channels.3
To start an action in cyberspace, there needs to be a computer that is connected to a
network. It can then proceed into the very detailed depth of a virtual realm. But the
internal world of cyberspace depends on the initial access through a physical piece of
technology.
Along with the technology, the second physical aspect of cyberspace is the
people. People determine the nature of cyberspace and shape what it looks like.4 Every
idea and piece of technology that can be found on the Internet is the product of a person’s
idea. There is no part of cyberspace that was not initially created by an individual. It is
also connected to people because if cyberspace is used in an attack, whether that is
against a state or private business, people are both the perpetrators and the victims. For
example, when a business is hacked and information is stolen, that information belongs to
someone. Whether he or she is actively involved in the business or not, that person is now
involved. People determine what occurs in the cyber realm.
However, there are outside sources that can persuade an individual to act in
certain ways. These sources can be traced to geopolitics. This is the case because
2

John B. Sheldon, “Geopolitics and Cyber Power: Why Geography Still Matters,” American Foreign
Policy Interests 36, no. 5 (2014): 286-7.
3

David Clark, “Characterizing Cyberspace: Past, Present, and Future,” Office of Naval Research,
March 12, 2010, 2.
4

Clark, “Characterizing Cyberspace,” 4.
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geography plays a role in determining where people act and whom they act against.5 A
key factor in this dynamic is politics. Geography and politics interact and determine the
target of the attack.6 Here geopolitics is centered in cyberspace.
This is not a new dynamic in cyberspace. It has been operating and directing
nations for years. In 2008, Georgia and Russia were involved in a conflict and started to
use cyber capabilities. Russia combined its military operations with cyber capabilities to
increase its strategic advantage against a vulnerable Georgia.7 It was coordinated at the
state level against another state and had far reaching consequences. Georgia’s network
was compromised and its cyber capabilities were limited so that a response could not be
launched.8 Russia used its technology to further its military’s advancement.
This operation had its base in geopolitics because the locations of the events were
chosen according to virtual locality and then were followed into the physical realm by the
military.9 The cyber events were specific to where the troops were going to be sent.
These were coordinated with where specific physical items and individuals could be
traced. The optimal goal of the use of cyber warfare was to disorient the Georgian public
and limit a counterattack so that the Russian military would have a greater chance of

5
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Sheldon, “Geopolitics and Cyber Power,” 288.
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success.10 The reason that cyber technology was involved in the conflict was to further
advance Russia’s interest in the physical realm.
Another example of how cyber actions can be motivated by state politics occurred
in 2010, when it was revealed that China had been infiltrating U.S. servers while
searching for information.11 China used a flaw in Internet Explorer to execute state
espionage against another state.12 It was a poignant reminder that geographical
peculiarities retain their power in cyberspace and that states will take advantage of
technology. Internet browsers can be used by anyone in the world. China used them to
send malware to a foreign state. This is an example of how cyberspace is an aspect of
geographical reality.
Acting according to geographic strategy is not confined to states. Individual actors
may choose to attack foreign powers. They can choose their target for political or
financial benefits. Either motivation is connected to geopolitics because it derives from a
desire to harm a foreign nation. Popular culture conveys ideas about different places that
people may absorb or reject.13 Cultural influences can be as simple as a Saturday Night
Live joke about politics or Toby Keith promoting a certain image of America. These
convey ideas of what being an American should look like and are associated with the
geographical place.14 Social commentary also presents images about other parts of the
world. All of these can influence people to subscribe to their state’s national identity.
10

David Hollis, “Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008,” Small Wars Journal, January 6, 2011, 8.
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Geopolitical ideas can circulate through popular culture and influence an individual
against another state or his own.
Acts of cyber aggression are connected to geopolitics whether they originate from
the state or an individual. Geography plays a large role in determining how a person
thinks and against whom he acts. Computers and servers are required for an individual to
execute an attack. At its foundation, cyberspace is connected to geography and physical
places.
This is an important factor to remember. Political discourse can become very
abstract in its approach to cyber security, and it can focus on uncertainty, potential
militarization, and perceptions.15 Policymakers are tempted to focus on aspects of
cyberspace that cannot be seen. Cyberspace should not be approached as an abstract field
that cannot be influenced by strong material actions. Approaching cyberspace through a
geopolitical discourse provides a better framework for policymakers to develop a strategy
to promote cyber security.
The Strategy
Deterrence
The connections between cyber actions and geopolitics provide a base from which
a strategy of deterrence can be used to prevent cyber attacks.16 The strategy needs to be
developed on two levels to address different cyber threats and provide the most
protection. States need to create a strategy of deterrence that accounts for the different
type of threats that they face.
15

David Barnard-Wills and Debi Ashenden, “Securing Virtual Space: Cyber War, Cyber Terror, and
Risk,” Space and Culture 15, no. 2 (2012): 110, Sage.
16

Will Goodman, “Cyber Deterrence: Tougher in Theory than in Practice?,” Strategic Studies
Quarterly, September 2010, 102.
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It is important to define what type of deterrence should be used in cyberspace.
Two types of deterrence should be applied: deterrence by punishment and deterrence by
denial. Deterrence by punishment relies on the threat of effective retaliation in response
to an attack.17 Deterrence by denial is a strategy that works to convince would-be
attackers that they will be unsuccessful, convincing them that there is no value in making
an attempt.18 A state should use this dual approach when creating its strategy of
deterrence.
The first concept of deterrence is deterrence by punishment. This is a common
type of deterrence that has been used in military affairs for decades. It is one state telling
another state that there will be a counterattack if it is harmed. This form of classical
deterrence relies on the assumption that an actor does not have a desire to be harmed.
Hence, if the actor believes that there will be a harsh enough consequence to his actions,
he will not commit them. This logic should be applied to cyberspace to discourage states
from cyber war.
When applying deterrence to cyberspace, what type of aggression will justify
retaliation must be made clear. Similarly, the level of retaliation that is justified must be
determined. Cyber aggression varies from espionage to combined operations with the
military like Russia used in 2008. A strategy of deterrence must account for the varying
types of attacks. Because of this, retaliation should be proportional to the type of attack.19

17

Emilio Iasiello, “Is Cyber Deterrence an Illusory Course of Action?,” Journal of Strategic Security
7, no. 1 (2013): 55.
18

Iasiello, “Is Cyber Deterrence Illusory,” 55.

19

Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 28.
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The punishment need not be the same type of attack, but it must be deemed equally
detrimental.
This is an important distinction because a state does not want an attack to
escalate. Keeping the threat of retaliation to the same degree of damage is the best way to
keep the attacker from issuing a counterattack.20 While a state does not want its
information stolen, it is comparatively better than being attacked militarily. Any
retaliatory strike should take into account the amount of damage it will inflict and the
probable response of the other state. Deterrence as punishment is only successful if it
does not lead to another attack.
Critics of deterrence in cyberspace cite attribution as a reason against
implementing the strategy.21 Attribution is the lack of ability to find the perpetrator of the
attack. Often, an attacker can hide where he is working and make it difficult to find him.
This means that a threat of retaliation fails because the attacker believes that he will not
be found and can, therefore, not be attacked.
However, the problem of attribution is often overstated. While it is true that there
are times where an attacker is difficult to find, it should not define the approach to
cyberspace.22 One way that people can be traced is through the connection between
cyberspace and geopolitics. Cyber attacks function through a constant connection to
materiality. This connection can be through the physical means of the attack or through

20

Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 28.

21
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7, no. 1 (2013): 58.
22
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the motivation. Because of that, there are different ways that the source of the attack can
be found.
The first way that a state can trace an attacker is through the physical means of the
attack. Each hack leaves behind a certain amount of information through an IP address.
That information can then be traced with the goal of re-creating a trail to the original
source. This is specific to geography because an IP, Internet protocol, address can
provide a latitude and longitude. A state can use it to take a cyber attack out of a virtual
reality and place it into the physical world.
Geopolitics can also help resolve the attribution problem by providing a lens
through which investigators can determine a motive. Attackers are motivated by specific
politics or driven by their home states.23 If the state trying to retaliate can figure out the
reason behind the attack, it can place the origin within a specific geography. Doing so
would increase the chances of success if a state were to adopt a deterrence by punishment
strategy.
The second type of deterrence, deterrence by denial, can also be applied to resolve
the problem of attribution. The reason behind this is that deterrence by denial does not
rely on knowing the attacker. A state uses its own measures to send the signal to any
potential attacker that it will fail. It is presented to the general population instead of a
specific individual. The goal of this style of deterrence is to show impenetrability.
Deterrence by punishment relies on a threat. Both are useful in cyberspace but are
presented in different scenarios.

23

John B. Sheldon, “Geopolitics and Cyber Power: Why Geography Still Matters,” American Foreign
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Because deterrence by denial is a signal that an attack will be unsuccessful, it is a
system of defense. A state invests in its infrastructure so that it cannot be violated. This
should be a priority. One way this can implemented is through devoting resources to
developing technology. Cyber attacks rely on one form of technology penetrating, or
beating, another. A state can decrease the likelihood of this occurring by promoting cyber
growth within its domestic sphere. Specifically, the state should work on creating
nuanced systems and training people who know how to use them. Having a system of
technology that surpasses other states is beneficial in preventing cyber attacks.
When pursuing better technology, states should remember that a large part of their
defense will rely on the lack of human error. No policy can be made with the assumption
that people will respond perfectly. This means that states must create defensive strategies
that take into account human error and other possible failures.24 There should be
fallbacks built into the system’s design so that, if an attack were to occur, an error would
not derail the defense system.
This leads to another important tactic that can be employed in cyber defense:
education. Educating people as to what a potential threat would look like and constantly
being on the lookout are beneficial to a state’s strategy.25 Educating the public makes a
broad audience aware of the threat and what potential enemies can do in cyberspace. This
will lead them to increase their personal cyber security as well as be more alert to what is
going on around them, bolstering the state’s security. And it supports deterrence by
denial because it sends a signal to a would-be attacker that people are aware of the threat

24

Tim Ridout, “Building a Comprehensive Strategy of Cyber Defense, Deterrence, and Resilience,”
The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 40, no. 2 (2016): 81, ProQuest.
25
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and are doing all they can to prevent it from occurring. It involves the state as well as
private entities.
Adopting this form of deterrence is also beneficial because it provides another
level of protection against lone actors. Retaliation can be difficult to accomplish if a
decision must be made over a state acting against a lone individual. If a state were to act
against an individual without the approval of the sovereign state within whose territory he
resides, the likelihood of escalation is high. This can make the threat of retaliation against
lone actors difficult. Deterrence by denial is meant to be the best option. It provides
incentives against an actor trying to commit his attack because a state’s defensive
measures are so strong that the likelihood of succeeding is very low.
However, if deterrence by denial is unsuccessful against a lone actor, states are
still able to use deterrence by punishment. A lone or non-state actor commits his attack in
a geographical area and relies on material supplies to succeed. As mentioned, deterrence
by punishment does not need to be the same type of attack as the initial harm. In the case
of a lone actor, it would be a response that harms what they need or care about. A state
could respond by cutting off their means of supplies and travel. Lone and non-state actors
are not protected because they do not have a territorial state. They rely on material
objects to accomplish their cyber attacks and can, hence, be found and punished.26
A dual system of deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial also helps
states offset the cost of having a deterrence strategy. This is important because the key
reason to employ a strategy against cyber attacks is to prevent them at the lowest cost.

26
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Deterrence by retaliation can lower the cost of cyber defenses.27 Resources and effort are
put into inhibiting an attacker’s attempt by threatening retaliation.28 If the threat is
successful, then there is no attack. No added resources need be expended for defense.29 It
would be very expensive to focus solely on defense. For example, in 2009 the federal
government sought $7.3 billion to protect government computers.30 The billions of
dollars in expenditures do not guarantee that the U.S. is impenetrable. It would also be
unwise to focus exclusively on offense. The threat of retaliation is insufficient if there is
no system to support it. A dual system of deterrence by punishment and deterrence by
denial is necessary to support a strong system of cyber security for an individual state.
Because of this, states should adopt both deterrence by punishment and deterrence
by denial. Doing so means that the state approaches the problem of cyber attacks from
both an offensive and a defensive perspective. This is important because these two
options support one another and create a dual strategy whereby a state can choose one or
both to deploy according to the situation. If a state were to rely solely on one aspect, an
unexpected attack could be catastrophic.31 A two-prong system is the best way to
approach threats.
International Law
The second part of the strategy is developing an international system of norms
and laws. States should not isolate themselves in cyberspace but should work with one
27

Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 33.

28
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another. They should seek international consensus on actions because, while deterrence is
helpful, it is not able to resolve every type of cyber threat.32 A system of international
norms, supported by laws, can support an individual state’s fight for cyber security. If
that is implemented, the likelihood of cyber attack occurring is greatly diminished.
There is also the question of international legitimacy. The world is not a system of
states that act without others noticing and responding with approval or condemnation. For
example, the United States condemned Russia’s annexation of Crimea as an illegal use of
force under international law.33 There is a general understanding as to what is acceptable
for states to do and what is not. A strategy of cyber security is a new policy area for states
and needs to be addressed in conjunction with other nations.
The first thing that needs to be addressed in the international arena is the
international definition of cyber war. A definition of what constitutes an attack for a state
would help develop a legitimate system of deterrence in the international sphere. A
historical way of approaching conflict is through the laws of war. A way to establish a
legitimate system in cyber war is to look at the international legal documents that address
just war and what actions constitute attacks and when force is allowed.
Such a document is the United Nations Charter. It addresses the matter of “force”
in Article 2(4). Specifically, it says that a member of the UN shall not use the threat of
force against another state unless it is otherwise lawfully qualified.34 Cyber operations

32

Paul K. Davis, “Deterrence, Influence, Cyber Attack, and Cyberwar,” International Law and Politics
47, no. 327 (May 21, 2015): 354.
33

Kristina Daugirdas and Julian Davis Mortenson, “United States Condemns Russia’s Use of Force in
Ukraine and Attempted Annexation of Crimea,” The American Journal of International Law 108, no. 4
(October 2014): 784, ProQuest.
34

Michael N. Schmitt, Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring Cyberattacks: Informing Strategies
and Developing Options for U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2010), 153.
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need to be approached in the context of this article. This Article does not prohibit states
from acting against other states in every instance. There are times when it is considered
justified. The question is situated around what constitutes a “use of force.”35
The easiest way to approach the discussion is to look at the type of cyber events
that can result in physical harm. This type of attack is equal to an armed attack and is
considered force.36 For example, it could be an attack on an electrical system that controls
waterworks, thereby causing a flood.37 Or it could be an attack on the electrical grid that
might have varying physical repercussions: one being that life-support machines would
shut down.38 An attack that damages a country or its population in a material way is
considered an armed attack.
The general interpretation of force is that a use of force is anything that harms a
country’s critical infrastructure. Such an attack involves one state using armed force
against another because it damages another state’s ability to operate. It is not simply a
state improving its position by stealing information from another. This distinction
becomes problematic where critical infrastructure is defined differently by each nation. In
the context of cyber warfare, that leaves open an opportunity for escalation via harm to
vital infrastructure. A general consensus should be reached for what type of infrastructure
is of enough importance to justify a retaliatory response.

35
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For example, the 2003 U.S. National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace describes
vital systems as the “physical and cyber assets of public and private institutes
in…agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services, government, defense
industrial base, information and telecommunications, energy transportation, banking and
finance, chemicals and hazardous materials, and postal shipping.”39 This definition
presents a list of national services that should operate unhindered after an attack for the
attack not to be considered an armed attack. States that do not have the same scope of
infrastructure as the U.S. can still create a legal clause outlining what services are
necessary to keep their country secure. They might not reach the same scale but states
that have access to cyber space would include agriculture, food, water, public heath, and
other services that other states can agree are vital. A consensus should be reached that all
these elements constitute critical infrastructure.
Cyber attacks can also be considered a use of armed force because states have
included such attacks in their military doctrine.40 China, Israel, and Germany have cyber
units as part of their military strategy.41 Many states include it in their military activity.
This could be seen in the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008. Cyber technology can
bolster military activities and will continue to be used in conjunction with armed forces.
A definition of what constitutes an armed attack should include cyber actions.
If an attack does not fall within the criteria outlined above, is it an armed attack?
Because cyber attacks can be varied, they should not be defined by narrow criteria. The

39
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definitions should be in place along with criteria for how to evaluate scenarios that do not
meet the set definitions. Cyber attacks should be evaluated along the following criteria:
severity, invasiveness, and immediacy.42
Severity should be the first factor that a state looks at when a non-conventional
attack occurs. Severity is determined by the scale, scope, and duration of the
consequences of the attack.43 A state can look at the how many people will be affected by
the attack and whether it will impact their lives for a short or long period of time. If there
is not a long-term consequence, the state may find that the attack was not very severe.
Likewise, a state can look at how far the attack reached. If the attack did not touch a large
area, then the cost of directly responding to the attack probably outweighs the damage of
the attack.
The second factor is invasiveness. This factor considers whether or not a system is
penetrated.44 A significant portion of cyber attacks involves hacking information systems.
If there are no repercussions to someone’s physical well-being or infrastructure, hacking
does not constitute a use of force. This is a key factor because cyber technology is a large
component of modern state’s intelligence gathering.45 China has used its cyber
capabilities to try to gain information. It is regarded as invasive but does not constitute an
act of force.
The final factor that should be evaluated is immediacy. States should keep in
mind how much time they have to respond to the attack. If the consequences of the attack
42
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occur quickly, there is less of a chance of reaching a peaceful solution.46 This framework
helps justify a state using a threat of force or force against another state after an attack.
Creating an international consensus on the legal definition of cyber attack as force and
then creating a framework to evaluate attacks will help states formulate their responses to
a cyber attack.
After creating an international consensus that cyber attacks constitute an armed
attack, states need to agree as to how the laws of war should address cyber threats. The
first law of just war is jus ad bellum. Jus ad bellum includes the rules that regulate the
use of armed force by states in international relations.47 Agreement by the international
community to a definition of force handles a large part of this theory. Jus ad bellum
allows for action against other states in the case of self-defense and in cases where the
state’s sovereignty has been violated.
Another law of just war is jus in bello. Jus in bello raises the questions of
necessity, proportionality, distinction, and neutrality.48 The first question relates to the
type of advantage that a cyber attack will give the attacker. It makes one state look at the
military advantage gained from the hostile act made by another.49 This subset of jus in
bello needs to be contextualized in cyber warfare with the new understanding that a
military attack does not need to involve physical movements or troops on the ground. A
cyber attack can be an armed attack even without using material forces.
46
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This leads to the second principle of jus in bello, which is proportionality.
Proportionality prohibits an attack that might result in civilian death, injury, or property
damage that would be excessive compared to a military attack.50 The deterrence strategy
outlined previously created a framework that aligns with this principle by advocating for
a response in kind. A consensus needs to be developed on the international scale that
states may act in the same manner in their approach to cyber threats. This means that the
type of damage a cyber attack can cause and the long-term consequences need to be
anticipated.51 A state should draft its response even before knowing the full extent of the
damage. States should work together to prevent excessive retaliatory action. Such an
action would include a retaliatory attack against a civilian network after being attacked
by the military. This would violate the principle of distinction in jus in bello. States are
required to distinguish between civilian and military targets when crafting their attacks.52
In the context of cyber warfare, this principle prohibits cyber-attacks that are
uncontrollable and could harm either civilian or military assets.53 However, there is a
caveat. Civilians lose their right to immunity when they play a direct part in an attack or
act as combatants.54 If a civilian attacked a state or worked for the state, he or she is
culpable. A state needs to evaluate the type of target it is pursuing as it works towards
cyber security.
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The final point posed by jus in bello is neutrality. A matter of debate is whether a
state is responsible for an actor within its territory.55 This question also needs to be
situated under the rules of jus ad bellum. If there is not agreement between states on who
is responsible and an attack occurs, the possibility for either escalation or an attacker to
go unpunished increases. An international agreement needs to be reached on how states
should approach individual actors.
One trait that states can look for is “uniform hackers.”56 As previously mentioned,
some states have military cyber units. They could deploy a few individuals to commit an
attack while attempting to conceal their direct connections to the state. Individuals could
also be hired by the state to complete an attack.57 A prime example of this occurred in
2008 when Russia hired an outside firm to conduct the attacks against Georgia.58 They
are believed to have hired the Russian Business Network, a cybercrime syndicate that
commits attacks against various states for hire.59 The state should be held responsible if it
hires an outside actor to commit an attack. The state provides the intent and the cyber
crime firm provides the means.
A legal foundation for accountability can be found in the Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, which were adopted by the
International Law Commission in 2001. Article 8 states that the actions of a person or a
group “shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group
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of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that
State in carrying out the conduct.”60 This means that if a state employs or commands an
individual or group to attack another state, it is responsible for that action. Russia was
responsible for hiring the Russian Business Network to attack Georgia. There should be a
broad international consensus that what is written in the International Law Commission
applies to the international community and cyber warfare. If an actor is connected to a
state, the attacked state is justified in holding the aforementioned state accountable.
A remaining issue is how to approach actors that do not work with a state. On a
domestic level, such actors are approached through deterrence by denial. They can also
be approached in the international sphere. One way of doing so is to create international
alliances that address cyber activities.61 This is vital because an attack could come from
anywhere in the world. The problem is a global one that should be approached through
global cooperation.62 It is not a simple problem that can be solved by a state’s military
might. Cyberspace presents a unique opportunity for an attacker to conceal his identity.
The ambiguity and the distance between origin and attack it affords mean that the
stratagem is difficult to combat. Alliances can create a network that defines the area a
nation has to protect if attacked.
The first step to create an alliance system is complete once there is an
international consensus of what constitutes a cyber attack, providing a basis from which
to act. From there, nations should agree to cooperate on information sharing, evidence
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collection, and prosecution of those who committed the attack.63 Each step is necessary to
creating an alliance and signing a treaty. Each brings different benefits to resolve unique
problems when confronted with cyber war.
Information sharing is foundational because cyberspace relies on information. At
its core, the reason why cyber attacks are so dangerous is because modern societies rely
on technology to retain and relay information. The world is connected through
technology. Cyberspace is built into this system and an attack can take full advantage of
its vulnerabilities. Information sharing is important because it can help a state that has
suffered a cyber attack overcome it and pursue the perpetrator. A state’s ally can assist it
in vital information as it searches for the attacker.
Information sharing should be used in conjunction with evidence collection. A
consistent problem with cyber attacks is attribution. As previously argued, cyber attacks
connection to geography can help overcome that problem. There are material factors and
geographical motivations that can help a state trace the origins of the attack. However,
there are legal obstacles that could prevent a state from pursuing this track. The attacker
may have committed the attack within the sovereign territory of another state. This would
prevent the state from pursuing further evidence. For the investigation to continue, an
agreement should provide that states will work with one another to collect and share
evidence after a cyber attack.64 This will help resolve the problem of attribution and
increase the likelihood of catching the perpetrators of cyber attacks.
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The third step is for states to adopt an agreement to work together towards
prosecuting those that participate in cyber attacks that cross national borders.65 Prior to
this, states must establish steps to prevent cyber attacks or to work towards catching the
people who make them occur. It is also important that states have an established plan in
place for when they catch the attackers. Because attacks can happen on an international
scale, there needs to be an international framework.
The way this can be done is through creating Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, or
MLATs, that apply to cyber warfare.66 This is important because MLATS are treaties that
apply to law enforcement and entities involved in criminal investigations.67 They include
facets that would be beneficial for prosecutors and are created with a goal of helping
them when a case becomes cross-national. Some features of a MLAT can include
requesting searches, extradition, freezing assets, and serving judicial documents.68 A key
facet of this process for cyber warfare is the process of extradition. If a state finds that the
attacker acted within a separate sovereign state’s territory without instruction or coercion
from that state, the state is not liable for the lone actor. This means that deterrence by
punishment is not a viable strategy and deterrence by denial has already failed because an
attack has occurred. The state needs another option.
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An MLAT with an extradition clause should provide that option. The state where
the attacker operated would be under an obligation to arrest and extradite the individual,
reliant on sufficient evidence being presented that he caused the attack. If it were to
refuse to do so, the offended state could suspect that it was involved in the attack and
pursue other options. An MLAT is a necessary component in helping a state bolster its
ability to prosecute criminals in an international climate.
The last facet of what can be done in the international sphere applies to developed
countries. Some nations, like the United States, are heavily dependent on technology.
Other nations are further behind, although they are growing in their technological
pursuits. This creates a vastly uneven field for cyber attacks. A way to resolve the
differences is for more developed nations to assist developing nations when they confront
a cyber threat.69 It will prevent the developing state’s infrastructure from being harmed as
well as help the nations surrounding it. The more states that are equipped to confront
cyber threats, the more secure the international community is.70 The leading countries in
the world have an incentive to help the countries around them. Working in the
international sphere will bolster their domestic attempts to secure their cyber assets.
International cooperation can come through active assistance and passive
agreement of legal definitions. Both are important to the fight against cyber war. For a
state to act aggressively against a threat without fear of being condemned, there needs to
be a commonly understood definition of what is an attack. An international approach to
cyber warfare accomplishes that task. States are also better able to resolve cyber threats if
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they work together. Sharing information and creating MLAT treaties will foster the
ability to catch and prosecute the perpetrators of cyber attacks, regardless of where they
originate. A state should engage in these international strategies to create strong counterattack methods.
Conclusion
Cyberspace presents a new arena for policymakers to tackle. For the best solution
to be created, cyber actions should be placed within geopolitics. It creates a foundation
for people to formulate a better understanding of the threat as well as develop strategies
that can approach the physical and virtual aspects of cyber threats. After deploying
geopolitical approach, a state should use a strategy of deterrence by punishment and
deterrence by denial. It will address state and non-state actors through a dual process of
offense and defense. This is a domestic strategy that every state should use. An
international approach should also be used to add legitimacy to the domestic systems and
bolster their investigations after an attack. Shared understandings of cyber attacks and
agreements between states to work together after an attack will help catch attackers. If
these steps are followed, states will have a much stronger cyber security strategy.
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